A way is indicated to derive, from a preference relation on a Cartesian product, strength of preference relations on the coordinate sets. These strengths of preference relations are then used to reformulate several well-known properties of preference relations, and make their meaning more transparent. A new result for dynamic contexts is given.
Introduction
This paper examines the existence of several kinds of additively decomposable representing functions for preference relations on Cartesian products. This is done under the assumption that the coordinate sets are connected topological spaces, e.g., R y, or Iw. The representing functions which we shall find will be cardinal.
Several authors have dealt with cardinal additively decomposable representing functions under the assumption that the coordinate sets are 'mixture spaces', the main intended examples of mixture spaces being sets of probability distributions. See, for instance, Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , Fishburn (1965) , Polk& (1967) , Keeney and Raiffa (1976, Karni, Schmeidler and Vind (1983) . Usually the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstem (1953, ch. 3 and the appendix) are assumed, leading to linear representing functions. Cardinality is easily obtained in the presence of linearity because, if one linear function is a (strictly increasing) transformation of another linear function, then in fact it must be a linear transformation. Hence, if two linear functions induce the same preference relation, then they also induce the same strength of preference relation.
Matters are more complicated if the assumption of linearity is weakened to the assumption of continuity. To see this, let f and g be two continuous functions on a connected domain. Let f = cp . g for a transformation cp. For guaranteeing that cp is (positively) linear, the assumption of strict increasingness of cp no longer suffices. It must be strengthened to the more complicated assumption that cp preserves ('first-order') differences, as shown in Basu (1982) . The characterizing properties for preference relations on connected topological spaces, met in literature, reflect this additional complication.
This paper handles the additional complication by indicating a way to derive, from a preference relation on a Cartesian product ('revealed'), strength of preference relations on the coordinate sets. By means of these we formulate several properties and results, met in literature, for connected topological spaces. All reformulated versions will require that certain strengths of preferences, derived from the preference relation, do not reveal contradictions. We think the reformulated versions are more appealing, in clarifying the first-order difference idea which is always underlying continuous cardinal utility. 
Preferences and strengths of preferences
This section gives elementary definitions and notations. Further it indicates the way to derive the strength of preference relations from the preference relation.
Let n E N. Let +?, , . . . , Fn be connected topological spaces. The set of alternatives is the Cartesian product X,'Y,V,. It is endowed with the product topology, which is connected too. Let 2 be a binary relation on X, the preference relation of a decision maker. We write , n, such that V: x * Ey= ,V,( x,). Here, as usual, x, is the j th coordinate of x. We write x_,u, for x (with x, replaced by u,), and for i #j, (x_,, ,u,, w,) for x (with x, replaced by v,, and x, by w,). Coordinate (or index) i is non-essential if xP, u, = x for all x, u,; otherwise i is essential. The following definitions give the main tools in this paper. For an intuitive elucidation, suppose for simplicity that x, is better than y,, and u, is better than w,. Then a-, U, < b_,w, suggests that the positive argument, to obtain u, instead of w, on coordinate i, does not outweigh the obviously negative argument for the left alternative against the right alternative, as yielded by the coordinates j f i. And a-,x, % b_,y, suggests that the positive argument, to obtain x, instead of y,, does outweigh the same (negative) argument. We interpret this to mean that it has been revealed from k , that the strength of preference of x, over y, exceeds that of U, over w,.
A further definition: (1) forbids x,x,+,** y,y,).
q Analogues of the above theorem (and of the one below) for the case where coordinate sets are sets of probability distributions, are given in Fishburn (1965 ), Pollak (1967 , and Keeney and Raiffa Proof.
See Wakker (1986). 0
It is straightforwardly shown that in the above theorem 'concave' can be replaced by 'strictly concave', if in (4) for every E f 0 we have: not c@ ": ((Y -e)(/3 -6). Y aari (1978) studied versions of (4) for a! # /3 and c # 0. In the following property and theorem, it is assumed, slightly more generally than Koopmans 
Furthermore, the ('discount factor ') h in (i) is uniquely determined; U is cardinal.
Sketch of the proof.
we assume (ii), and derive (i) and the 'Furthermore'-statement. For every j22, and any x, y, S, x_(,_,+ %~_(~_i,6 and xPcJPI,y %
x_(,_,)Y, hence
by (5) Y >J * * SS for no y, 6 E V. We may apply Theorem 2, to obtain a representing function V: x ++ E:V,(x,). We may set V,(e) = 0 for all j. Since every j is CCI-related to j -1, there can be seen to exist A, such that V, = X,V,_, for all j.
This is much like in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Wakker (1984a). In short, the idea is that, for every j 2 2, and n E %?, there exists an open neighbourhood of n on which V, orders differences as V,_, does it. Hence locally 7 can be seen to be a positive affine transformation of V,-i. Then it must also be globally. Now VJ( 0) = 0 = V,_ i(e) implies the existence of A, as above.
Substitution of the preferences in (ii) concerning LY, /3, and 8, shows that, with A: = A,, we have A, = h for all j; and that 0 5 X 5 1. Since all points of time are essential, X = 0 cannot be. Finally,
The furthermore-statement follows from the cardinality of V in Theorem 2. 
Conclusion
It is desirable to formulate results, as much as possible, in terms of primitives of an adopted model. In decision theory the primitives are the set of alternatives, structure on this set, and the P. Wakker / Derived strengths ofpreference relatmns on coordinates preference relation of a decision maker. Derived notions (such as utility functions) should be adopted in the formulation of results, only if this achieves a significant intuitive gain, We hope that the derived strength of preference relations, as defined in this paper, do give a significant intuitive gain in the derivation of continuous cardinal utility.
